Special Seats for Women in the National Legislature: The Case of Tanzania
Mi Yung Yoon

This study examines attempts to increase the number of women serving in the Tanzanian parliament by implementation of a special-seat system for women, the evolution of the system, and the impact of the system on women’s competitiveness in the constituencies. The increase in the number of women elected in the constituencies and the movement of some women from special seats to constituency seats suggest that special seats can serve as stepping-stones to constituency seats, though their existence may discourage experienced and capable women from contesting in the constituencies, as argued by some analysts.

Women occupy just over 30 percent of the seats in the Tanzanian parliament. Largely because of a system that reserves 75 parliamentary seats for women, Tanzania is one of a handful of African countries that meet the 30 percent target of the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action for women’s parliamentary representation.1 Without this system, women would account for only about 7 percent of legislative seats, given that only seventeen women were elected to represent constituencies in the latest legislative election, held in 2005.

The special-seat system has increased women’s numerical representation in the Tanzanian parliament, but its usefulness beyond improving women’s numerical representation has been questioned by some analysts (Brown 2001:74; Kiondo 1994:190; Magigita 2005:43; Meena 1997:276, 2003). According to Meena (2003), women elected through this system lack accountability for other women, though they were elected on the basis of their gender. The political parties select and rank their candidates for special seats, and the special-seat members of parliament (MPs), particularly those interested in reelection, tend to promote their party’s position on women’s interests if it is in conflict with women’s interests. Elizabeth Kiondo (1990), Magigita (2005), and Meena (1997, 2003) argue that this system erodes women’s competitiveness in the constituencies because even powerful women take special seats, deemed less competitive than constituency seats.
Each of these arguments is distinct, and warrants a separate study. I focus on the latter, which has received scant attention in the literature on women and politics. Specifically, I examine whether the special-seat system truly undermines women’s competitiveness in the constituencies, as argued by some analysts. A closer look at previous legislative election results reveals that many special-seat members reentered subsequent legislatures through this system, implying that their argument is valid; however, what is missing or overlooked in the literature is the positive effect of the system on some special-seat MPs. This study therefore picks up what is left out in critiques of the special-seat system.

To accomplish this purpose, I interviewed the leaders of the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, the Parliamentary Strengthening Program in Tanzania, and the Tanzania Media Women’s Association in Dar es Salaam; and seventeen female MPs (nine constituency MPs, with or without special-seat experience, and eight special-seat MPs), from both the ruling and opposition parties, in Dodoma in June 2007. I also examined volumes of the National Assembly’s Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (National Assembly various years) to compile the names of female MPs in each legislature. My findings suggest that special seats can serve as stepping-stones to constituency seats, and they have increased the number of women elected in the constituencies.

**An Overview of Tanzanian Politics**

Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) became independent in 1961, as did Zanzibar in 1963; these former British colonies united to create the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. Zanzibar, however, has had its own constitution, president, cabinet, parliament (the House of Representatives), and electoral rules. The 1965 Interim Constitution created a one-party system under the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), abolishing the opposition parties that contested in the preindependence multiparty elections. TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party, the single political party in Zanzibar since 1964, merged in 1977 and created the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The permanent Constitution of 1977, which replaced the 1965 Interim Constitution shortly after the merger of the two parties, specified CCM as the only political party in Tanzania. During single-party rule, competitive parliamentary elections were held within TANU and later within CCM. Candidates—party members approved by the party—first faced a primary election in a party assembly at the constituency level. This assembly sent its preferential list to the National Executive Committee of the party (Van Donge and Liviga 1990:2). Only the top two candidates in the primary could stand for election in the constituency, upon the approval of the National Executive Committee, “which was not bound to follow the order of the list” (Okema 1990:39).
The Eighth Constitutional Amendment in July 1992 opened the way to the first postindependence multiparty elections in 1995 by removing the one-party system. Tanzania uses a first-past-the-post single-member plurality system to elect MPs in the constituencies every five years. The National Electoral Commission, which consists of seven commissioners appointed by the president, plans and prepares for elections. To run for a constituency seat, as during single-party rule, an aspirant must be a party member and must apply for a nomination. Nomination rules and procedures vary across the parties. In the case of CCM, the first stage involves the preferential votes for the aspirants by party delegates within the constituency. The preferential votes “are then submitted to the party headquarters for the final selection of one candidate for each constituency by the party’s National Executive Committee” (Msekwa 2005). The parties can nominate aspirants other than those who place first in the preferential votes, as they could during single-party rule. After nomination at the party level, the National Electoral Commission finally nominates candidates submitted by the parties.

Tanzania is one of a handful of African countries that have employed a special-seat system for women. The system was first introduced in 1985 under single-party rule (table 1). Unlike constituency MPs, special-seat MPs are indirectly elected. During single-party rule, candidates were elected by constituency members in the National Assembly among nominees submitted by the National Executive Committee of CCM (Killian 1996:25). The Eighth Constitutional Amendment in 1992 changed the election procedure for special seats, and for the past two legislatures (1995–2000 and 2000–2005), special seats were distributed “on the basis of the proportional representation among the parties which won elections in constituencies and secured seats in the National Assembly” (Government of Tanzania 1995). The allocation mechanism of special seats changed again in 2005. The special seats are now distributed proportionally on the basis of the number of votes won by each party in the parliamentary election, not on the basis of the number of parliamentary seats won by each party. Only parties that won “at least 5% of all valid votes for parliamentary election” can propose the names of special-seat candidates to the National Electoral Commission (National Electoral Commission 2006a:75). In a single-candidate constituency, “valid votes cast for presidential candidate of that party shall be used in determining that proportion” (National Electoral Commission 2006a:75). “If a political party did not nominate a presidential candidate, 51% of the total number of registered voters in that constituency shall be used to determine that proportion” (National Electoral Commission 2006a:76). The electoral commission has the ultimate authority to appoint special seats candidates to be MPs. Only three parties met the 5 percent threshold in 2005, and seventy-five special seats were proportionally divided among those three (table 2).

The political parties have used internal mechanisms to nominate special-seat candidates, as they have for constituency seats. With respect to CCM, aspirants submit their application forms to district offices of the
Union of Tanzania Women (Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania, UWT), the women’s wing of CCM. UWT district offices then forward the names to the UWT regional conferences, which consist of UWT leaders and female leaders from wards, districts, and regions, for contest. Each regional conference forwards the names of top five aspirants to the UWT national congress, which prioritizes and nominates candidates (Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 1997:72; 2000:140); the UWT’s list, however, needs to be approved by the National Executive Committee of the party. In 2005, of the top five candidates forwarded from each region, the top two were elected for the region and the rest went to the general pool (“basket”) of the UWT national congress to be ranked. To seek a CCM special seat, an aspirant should be a member of UWT. The CCM’s nomination procedure for special seats is very competitive, and aspirants must campaign hard to be selected at each level of screening. In respect of Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), aspirants must submit their credentials to the Central Committee, the highest organ of the party, which composes a list of nominees to send to the National Electoral Commission. Small political parties, in general, lack a well-established nomination procedure, and party leaders play a significant role in nominating special-seat candidates. This practice, according to leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), makes their nomination process for special seats susceptible to corruption. Overall, nominations for special seats favor well-known and accepted within the party and whose party loyalty is exemplary.

The Tanzanian parliament has evolved over time. Its number of seats has gradually increased, and its composition has changed with the adoption of multiparty system (table 1). In 1990, the National Assembly (Bunge) had 255 members: (a) 180 members elected to represent constituencies; (b) 25 regional commissioners; (c) 15 female special-seat members; (d) 15 members representing mass organizations affiliated to CCM; (e) 15 members nominated by the president; and (f) 5 members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives (National Electoral Commission 1997:123). Today, the parliament consists of 323 members: (a) 232 constituency members; (b) 75 female special-seat members; (c) 5 members indirectly elected by the Zanzibar House of Representatives from among its members; (d) the Attorney General; and (e) 10 members appointed by the president (Parliament of Tanzania 2007).

In Tanzania, parliamentary membership is a base for a cabinet post because the president (always from CCM up to now) appoints a prime minister and selects his cabinet members from among MPs (both constituency and special-seat MPs). Thus, the separation of powers is weak. In addition, the ruling party, CCM, has occupied an overwhelming majority of legislative seats (table 2). As seen in other democratizing countries in Africa, opposition parties in Tanzania (which are new and lack well-established electoral support base in the constituencies, party structure, campaign strategies, and resources) have posed no threat to CCM, whose dominance in legislative election outcomes has brought it a disproportionately large share of special
seats, significantly increasing its numerical representation in the legislature. This power structure implies that unless CCM is behind, female MPs may not be able to pass laws for women, though how such political context influences female MPs’ ability to represent women’s interests is beyond the scope of this study, and is yet to be examined.

The System of Special Seats for Women

The system of special seats for women, also called the reserved-seat system for women, is a gender quota used to redress severe gender gaps in parliamentary representation. As mentioned earlier, only a small number of countries have employed this mechanism in Africa (e.g., Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda), though many African countries have experienced severe gender imbalance in the legislature. In Tanzania, circumstances favorably contributed to the adoption of the system. One was women’s active participation in the liberation struggle as TANU members in the 1950s. The TANU nationalist movement, which emphasized gender equality, attracted many women, and by the end of 1955, “TANU had more women than men card-carrying members” (Geiger 1982:48). Particularly, the leadership and popularity of Bibi Titi Mohamed, head of the TANU women’s wing, attracted many women to the party (Geiger 1982:48). According to Geiger (1997:55), a TANU membership card cost two and a half shillings at that time. Women could purchase TANU cards because they engaged in a variety of income generating activities, though mainly in the informal sector. Women sold fish, donuts, bread, beans, fritters, firewood, and local beer (Geiger 1987:10); some engaged in farming, prostitution, dancing, and singing (Geiger 1987:15). TANU’s first female member, Bibi Titi Mohamed, was the lead singer of a women’s dance group, Bomba, when she first purchased her TANU membership card in 1955 (Geiger 1987:15). For TANU, women marched, mobilized communities for rallies, raised funds, housed party leaders when they visited their areas, sold TANU cards, and taught other women about the party (Geiger 1996:472–473). Thus, women’s active involvement in preindependence politics and their contribution to the nationalist movement provided moral justification for rectifying their exclusion from postindependence formal politics.

Julius Nyerere’s pronouncement of gender inequality in Tanzanian society and its impact on socialist transformation contributed to establishing the foundation for the system. Nyerere, founder of TANU and first president of the country, saw gender inequality as “an impediment to socialist transformation” (Geiger 1982:45). He stated:

By virtue of their sex, [women] suffered from inequalities which had nothing to do with their contribution to the family welfare. . . . This is certainly inconsistent with our socialist conception of the equality of all human beings. . . . If we want
our country to make full and quick progress now, it is essential that our women live on terms of full equality with their fellow citizens who are men. [Nyerere 1968:109]

The system may have been possible in part because of the socialist tradition of CCM. Since the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania has pursued a socialist policy that emphasizes self-reliance and equality [A. S. Z. Kiondo 1994:69]. The CCM Constitution, deeply rooted in the Arusha Declaration, specifies “equal opportunities to all citizens, women and men alike, irrespective of a person’s colour, tribe, religion or status” as one of the aims and objectives of the party [Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2006]. Last, women within CCM, particularly UWT members and women in earlier governments, spoke out for more women in politics.11

Several women—Marion Lady Chesham, B. C. Johansson, E. Markwalder, Bibi Titi Mohamed, and S. Mustafa as constituency MPs and Lucy S. Lameck as nominated MP—pioneered women’s representation in politics by entering the Tanganyika National Assembly in 1960,12 but women’s parliamentary representation had been negligible and unreliable. The number of female constituency MPs had fluctuated since 1960, but had never exceeded five, with zero for the period 1980–1985. The number of female appointed and special-seat MPs had not exceeded five, with exceptions of seventeen for the period 1975–1980 and fourteen for the period 1980–1985. The reality on the ground, therefore, did not match Nyerere and CCM’s rhetoric on gender equality. The social and economic disadvantages of women were such that a quota system was needed to guarantee steady representation of women in the parliament. Thus, the special-seat system for women was born as “a temporary gap-filling strategy” until women’s socioeconomic conditions should improve and more women gain political experience.13

When the special-seat system for women was introduced, in 1985, fifteen seats were reserved for women and another fifteen seats were reserved for mass organizations affiliated to CCM [the youth organization, cooperatives, workers’ organizations, a parents’ organization, and the Union of Tanzania Women, UWT] (Killian 1996:24; National Assembly 1985). Therefore, women could occupy special seats through fifteen seats allocated for women, through UWT, or through other mass organizations. Men occupied special seats representing mass organizations other than UWT. As implied above, special seats in the Tanzanian parliament existed even before 1985 to represent diverse groups, which included women; however, the system that guaranteed a certain number, later a certain percentage, of parliamentary seats for women came into being only in 1985. Ever since, each special seat for women has been called a “national MP for women” [mbungu wa Taifa ya wanawake].

For the 1995 election, the Eighth Constitutional Amendment in 1992 replaced fifteen special seats with a new total, defined as 15 percent of “the total of all elected members plus 5 members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives and the Union Attorney General” [a total of thirty-six seats]
and abolished special seats representing mass organizations [National Electoral Commission 1997:69]. The Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment in 2000 raised the proportion of special seats to 20 percent [forty-eight seats] for the 2000 election. The percentage was increased to 30 percent [seventy-five seats] in 2005. The increase in percentages can be attributed to “the lobbying efforts of UWT, women politicians, gender equality advocacy NGOs, and a certain degree of political will on the part of the government” to enhance women’s political representation in line with the international conventions it has signed and ratified, particularly the 1997 Southern African Development Community Declaration on Gender and Development, which called for at least 30 percent representation of women in political decision-making positions by 2005 [Mosha and Johnson 2004:35]. Women politicians and UWT argued that if the size of parliament were to expand, the number of special seats must also increase.14 Because of the rounding up or down of fractions of the number of special seats calculated for each party, the number of special seats can differ from the number described in the constitutional amendments, as in 1995, when thirty-seven seats were allocated, not thirty-six.15

The extant literature has offered little explanation on the duties of special-seat MPs. What do they do? Are they simply tokens? They perform the same functions constituency MPs perform: inside of the parliament, they participate in parliamentary debates, serve on parliamentary committees, and vote on bills seeking enactment or amendment; outside of the parliament, they run various projects [e.g., HIV/AIDS prevention, building hospitals and schools, setting up water and electrical systems, providing entrepreneurial skills, and arranging microcredits].16 But their areal coverage is much broader than that of constituency MPs. Though each constituency MP serves a constituency, each special-seat MP serves a region, which consists of from four to nine constituencies, or a group. CCM, which currently occupies fifty-eight special seats, appoints two special-seat MPs for each of the country’s twenty-six regions [twenty-one in the mainland and five in Zanzibar]. CCM special-seat MPs who do not serve a region work for one of the following groups: university, disabled, youth, and NGOs, each of which submits five special-seat candidates to the UWT national congress, as does each UWT regional conference.17 However, special-seat MPs of the opposition parties separately serve more than one region because their parties occupy fewer than twenty-six special seats.18 For example, in the current legislature, the Civic United Front [CUF] occupies eleven special seats, and twenty-six regions are divided among eleven special-seat MPs.

Obstacles to Women’s Entry into the Legislature as Constituency MPs

Women in Tanzania received the right to vote and the right to stand for elections in 1959, but have won only a small proportion of constituency seats. What has hindered women’s winning constituency seats, and justified the
continuous use of the special-seat system? The civil society leaders and the female MPs I interviewed described a patriarchal culture, the lack of resources available to women, and the biased party nomination as the most serious barriers to women’s winning constituency seats. These barriers are interrelated and are shared by women in many other African countries. Some analysts [Foster 1993:111; Ufomata 1998:66] have discussed the gender gap in education as an obstacle to women’s political representation in Africa, but my interviews with female MPs suggest that this is not the case in Tanzania. According to them, voters in Tanzania do not care about candidates’ educational backgrounds because they consider candidates’ willingness and ability to deliver services as most important. They add that with respect to the education qualification for nomination of parliamentary candidates, the Constitution requires only an ability to read and write in Kiswahili or English; however, they acknowledge that the gender gap in education has hindered women’s access to economic resources, instrumental to winning elections, and has indirectly affected women’s winning constituency seats.

Patriarchal Culture

Tanzania is a patriarchal society, which favors segregated gender roles [Mukangara and Koda 1997:38]. The expected roles of women are as wives and mothers, and politics is not considered a female domain. Women are relegated to inferior positions, and are deemed to be unfit for leadership positions [Mascarenhas 2007:71]. How, then, could women actively participate in the liberation struggle as TANU members? According to Tenga and Peter [1996:146], TANU needed to mobilize men and women to grow into an effective organization of nationalist struggle. Because the colonial government and other employers disapproved joining TANU, employed men were afraid of associating with TANU for fear of losing their jobs, and it was essential for TANU to reach out to women, who were mostly not employed in the formal sector [Geiger 1997:72, 82]. However, women’s political activism was not always well received, particularly by men, outside of TANU [Geiger 1982:48; Tenga and Peter 1996:147–148]. Some TANU women were divorced by their husbands for their activism [Geiger 1997]. In the early years of TANU, TANU female leaders traveling to mobilize other women were criticized because “there was certainly no precedent for women travelling for political purposes” [Geiger 1997:75]. They were accused of drawing other women to political activism from their homes [Geiger 1997:76]. TANU women, after all, hardly changed the male-dominant culture, which has survived to this day.

The social attitudes and stereotypes toward women that are shaped by patriarchal culture often influence women’s decisions to run for elective office and the electorate’s voting decisions. “There are well-educated and capable women who can contest in constituencies, but they are shy,” says Fatma Maghmibi.19 Even if women decide to run, they commonly face threats, insults, mudslinging, and sexual harassment during their campaigns.
from their electorate and male opponents.\textsuperscript{20} For example, when Maghimbi was first running for the Chake-Chake constituency seat in Pemba, in 1995, some voters tried to discredit her candidacy by saying, “Hen does not crow; only cock crows.”\textsuperscript{21} In 2005, when Hawa Ghias was contesting in the Mtwaraji constituency, where 80 percent of the population is Muslim, some voters questioned how a Muslim woman could become a leader. She responded, “I am not contesting to become a leader of a mosque.” She urged voters to judge her on her ability to represent them in the parliament.\textsuperscript{22} In the case of Esterina Kilasi, who contested in the Mbarali constituency in 2000 for the first time, her male contenders questioned how a married woman could serve “two masters,” referring to her husband and the constituency. They asked what she would do if she became pregnant. As to married female candidates, voters and male contenders ask whether their husbands support their contests; if not, that becomes an important campaign issue.\textsuperscript{23}

Male-dominant culture and tradition restrict female candidates’ campaigns. According to Jenista Mhagama, female candidates in many communities cannot campaign in the evening because women are expected to remain inside after dark. This cultural expectation presents a significant disadvantage to female candidates because much of the campaigning and information gathering is conducted at night, when voters assemble at street corners to discuss issues of concern. In addition, some places—like bars and nightclubs, where male candidates often canvass—are considered off-limits to women.\textsuperscript{24} It is not unusual for female candidates who do not act in accordance with these cultural norms to be called prostitutes by their male competitors.\textsuperscript{25} Also, the media are biased against female candidates, whom, according to Mosha and Johnson (2004:77), they often demonize and infantilize. The media’s unfriendly attitudes toward female candidates, however, are gradually changing, largely because of the efforts of women’s NGOs.\textsuperscript{26} Voters’ negative attitudes toward female candidates are slowly changing because of the good performance of some female politicians.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Lack of Resources}

Many Tanzanian women lack the resources needed to contest in constituencies.\textsuperscript{28} According to various media sources, a majority of women interested in running for parliamentary seats cannot afford even the deposit of 50,000 Tanzanian shillings (about US$45) that must be paid in cash to the returning officer in the constituency for nomination forms.\textsuperscript{29} It is mainly because of their low income.\textsuperscript{30} The estimated earned income for women in Tanzania was $569 in purchasing-power parity in 2004, 73 percent of the estimated male earned income in that year (United Nations Development Programme 2006). Women in communities where customary laws, which prohibit women from owning or inheriting land or property, prevail have fewer resources to utilize for their political endeavor.\textsuperscript{31}

Since the adoption of the multiparty system, campaign expenses have escalated because of the competitiveness of multiparty elections. During
single-party rule, the government covered election expenses because candidates were not allowed to raise campaign funds (A. S. Z. Kiondo 1994:67). Multiparty elections, however, have transferred the financial burden to the parties and their candidates. For the first multiparty parliamentary election in 1995, the government granted a subsidy to each party in the amount of one million shillings for each constituency candidate to ease its campaign costs, but the bulk of campaign expenses still had to be paid by the parties and the candidates (Msekwa 2005). The government decided not to renew the subsidies in 2000, alleging gross abuse of the subsidy fund in 1995 (Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 2000:78). According to Pius Msekwa (2005), former Speaker of the National Assembly, some political parties had fielded “frivolous candidates” to qualify for government subsidies. The elimination of government subsidies has seriously hurt opposition candidates, whose parties have fewer resources than CCM. Even if candidates are financially supported by their parties, they must pay for their own campaign materials (fliers, flags, brochures, T-shirts, etc.), vehicles, fuel, and agents’ expenses.32 Increased campaign costs, coupled with the law that requires government employees to quit their jobs after nomination, discourage capable women from contesting in constituencies. Candidates may resume their jobs if they lose the election, but it is hard for opposition candidates to get their jobs back.33

According to female MPs, candidates in Tanzania cannot count on campaign contributions to finance their campaigns because most people, particularly women, have no money to contribute.34 In this context, candidates’ ability to finance their own campaigns appears to be crucial. The current female constituency MPs’ socioeconomic backgrounds hint that they are financially better off than most other women. All of them before their first entry into the legislature had been employed in the formal sector as teachers, civil servants, company managers or accountants, regional or district party secretaries, medical doctors, or academic administrators.35 Anne Kilango Malecela’s husband, John Malecela, is also an MP. Furthermore, most female constituency MPs have been in the legislature for more than one term, and have received money from the government under the Retirement Benefits Act of 1999, which “entitles each MP from the Mainland to 20 million Tanzanian shillings and each MP from Zanzibar to 10 million Tanzanian shillings as an acknowledgment of their service to the country” (Mosha and Johnson 2004:37).

*Biased Party Nomination*

Women have accounted for a very small portion of candidates in each election (table 3). As a result, a majority of constituencies have had no female candidate. For example, in 2005, of 232 constituencies, 133 fielded no woman.36 The paucity of female candidates has much to do with the single-member plurality system in Tanzania. In single-member plurality systems, where parties nominate only one candidate per constituency, parties are reluctant to
nominate women, who are perceived as less likely to win because of the electorate's cultural bias against women. Particularly, women outside the close circles of the party leadership, and less well-known to the party leadership, have fewer chances to be nominated (Mosha and Johnson 2004:20, 111). In addition, party nominations in Tanzania, as in other countries, tend to favor incumbents, who already have political experience and a well-established network within the party, over newcomers, who are mostly women.

Nonetheless, the number of female candidates has increased over time, with sharp leaps in 1995 and 2005 (table 3). Among the factors that contributed to the first sharp increase in 1995 are the adoption of a multiparty system, the increase in the number of constituencies from 180 in 1990 to 232 in 1995, and the efforts of women’s NGOs to field more women. The multiparty parliamentary election and the creation of more constituencies opened up unprecedented opportunities for women to contest for constituency seats. Women’s NGOs, particularly the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme and the Tanzania Media Women’s Association, encouraged women to stand for constituency seats and offered seminars, symposia, forums, and workshops to train female aspirants for confidence building, public speaking, campaign management, fundraising, lobbying, and leadership. In addition, they urged the political parties to nominate more women. The second sharp increase, in 2005, likely resulted from the further increase in the number of parties from thirteen in 1995 and 2000 to eighteen in 2005 and the continuing efforts of women’s NGOs to increase the number of female candidates. Five parties registered after the 2000 election (Chama cha Haki na Usitawi, Jahazi Asilia, Democratic Party, Sauti ya Umma, and Forum for Restoration of Democracy), and together they fielded forty-five women in 2005.

Once nominated, women can win if fully supported by their parties, which organize campaigns and publicize their policies and candidates “through public meetings, door-to-door canvassing, news media, posters, and placards” (National Electoral Commission 2006a:60). Strong party support is particularly crucial for women because the majority of voters in Tanzania tend to vote for their parties. The likelihood of being elected is greatest for women who are nominated and fully supported by parties capable of winning a large number of constituency seats (table 4). Candidates from small parties are rarely elected in Tanzania. That said, women nominated by CCM, which has resources and a well-established electoral support base from the national to the village level, have a higher probability of winning than female candidates of other parties. Of eight women elected in constituencies in 1995, seven were CCM candidates. All twelve women elected in 2000 were CCM members, and sixteen of seventeen women elected in 2005 belong to CCM. The CCM’s ability to elect women is further demonstrated by the case of Teddy Kasella-Bantu, who ran and won in the constituency in 2005 as a CCM candidate after two defeats in earlier elections as a United Democratic Party candidate. CCM, however, has fielded a small number of women for constituency seats: only seven in 1995, thirteen in 2000, and nineteen in 2005. Therefore, women accounted
for just 3 percent of CCM’s constituency candidates in 1995, 6 percent in 2000, and 8 percent in 2005.

The primary challenge for women in CCM’s nomination process appears to be the preferential votes by constituency party delegates, who might mirror their constituents’ negative views toward female candidates. It is difficult for women to top the list in the party primaries. Their difficulty has been somewhat compensated by the efforts of the national party leadership to elect more women into the legislature. The CCM National Executive Committee has nominated female runners-up who placed second or even third in the preferential votes. For example, Esterina Kilasi, the only female candidate in her constituency primary in 2000, placed third, but the party nominated her. According to Anne Makinda, the party nominated five women who placed second in the primaries in 2005; the party, however, would not nominate women simply to nominate more women: they should still be considered “electable” by the party, says Makinda.

**Does the Special-Seat System Erode Women’s Competitiveness in the Constituencies?**

As mentioned earlier, critics argue that the special-seat system undermines women’s competitiveness in electoral politics because women, including veteran female politicians, prefer to compete for special seats. The system, according to Meena, takes “the pressure off political parties to nominate women” (2003:6) for constituency seats because women have their own avenue to parliamentary seats. As a result, women tend to be nominated for special seats, rather than for constituency seats [Mosha and Johnson 2004:107]. To support their arguments, critics have noted the large ratios of special-seat MPs to total female MPs, or cited a few examples of powerful women who sought special seats.

As pointed out by the critics, most female MPs have entered the legislature through the special-seat system [table 1]. The ratio of special-seat MPs to total female MPs was 0.71 in 1985, 0.68 in 1990, 0.79 in 1995, 0.76 in 2000, and 0.77 in 2005. Moreover, according to my observation, many special-seat MPs have reentered subsequent parliaments as special-seat MPs. Even experienced special-seat MPs continued to seek special seats despite having notable political experience as MPs, ministers, or deputy ministers. For example, of forty-eight special-seat MPs in the last parliament, slightly more than half returned to the present legislature as special-seat members in 2005. Only five of them (Zainab Gama, Teddy Kasella-Bantu, Jenista Mhagama, Zabein Mhita, and Mary Nagu) contested for constituency seats in 2005, and all of them won by a large margin of votes.43

If a vast majority of female MPs have entered the legislature through special seats, why do women generally prefer to seek special seats? The reasons are more diverse than those mentioned by the critics. According to female MPs, some women have resorted to special seats because of the
cultural and resource barriers that were discussed earlier. Some have preferred to seek special seats because special seats provide an easier way to enter parliament, compared with constituency seats. Some women aged 60 or greater have sought special seats, which are considered less demanding than constituency seats. As an example, Anna Abdallah switched from a constituency seat to a special seat in 2005; Hawa Ghasia and Ichikaeli Maro regard her move as her intention to withdraw from active politics before retirement. Other women have sought special seats for their unique circumstances. For example, Maua Daftari, a fourth-term CCM special-seat MP from Pemba and Deputy Minister of Infrastructure and Development, has been interested in contesting in the constituency, but her likely defeat has discouraged her from contesting. Given that Pemba is a CUF stronghold and the voters tend to vote along party lines, her probability of winning is low, even though she is well respected in the constituency. Zakia Hamdani Meghji, a special-seat MP from 1995 to 2005 and currently a presidential appointee to the legislature and Minister of Finance, has no suitable constituency to choose to contest: she was born in Zanzibar, is married to a man from the mainland, and had taught at a university in Moshi before she entered the legislature in 1992 as a presidential appointee; in a sense, she has no single place to which she can relate herself. Women’s NGO leaders and female MPs, therefore, state that presidential appointments and special seats are useful tools to recruit to politics capable women, like Maua Daftari and Zakia Hamdani Meghji, who might not have a chance to be recruited otherwise.

Special seats have been the major path for women to parliament, but the number of women elected in constituencies has gradually increased. Only four women were elected in constituencies when the special-seat system for women was established in 1985, but seventeen were elected in constituencies in 2005. What can explain this increment with the passage of time? The political backgrounds of female-constituency MPs suggest that the steady increase in the number of female constituency MPs over the years is because some women who had previously occupied special seats or, “rarely,” appointed seats moved to constituency seats (table 5). Women who had held a special seat or an appointed seat in the previous legislatures at least once have accounted for a significant proportion of female constituency MPs since 1995: 75 percent, 1995–2000; 50 percent, 2000–2005; and 59 percent, 2005–2010. Particularly, a majority of women elected in constituencies in 1995 and 2005 started their parliamentary career as special-seat MPs. Of eight women elected in constituencies in 1995, five had had special-seat experience. Of seventeen female constituency MPs in the current legislature, nine have held a special seat at least once. Without their shifts to constituency seats, the number of female constituency MPs would have been much lower. Some women who switched to constituency seats [e.g., Anne Makinda, Monica Mbega, Getrude Mongella, and Tatu Ntimizi] have been successful in repeatedly winning a constituency seat. A few of them hold high-profile positions as MPs. Makinda is the first female
deputy speaker in the Tanzanian parliament, and Mongella is the President of the African Union Parliament. According to Makinda, voters are willing to reelect female constituency MPs with proven records of good performance, and, to women, the first contest in the constituency is the most challenging one because of the cultural barrier.⁴⁷

One might ask why some special-seat MPs run for constituency seats while others have not. In the case of long-term special-seat MPs, pressure from the national party leadership, particularly since the adoption of multiparty elections, has motivated them to seek constituency seats because special seats are viewed as a training ground for inexperienced new MPs.⁴⁸ Former President and CCM Chairman Benjamin Mkapa, for example, urged senior special-seat MPs to run for constituency seats.⁴⁹ Some MPs have suggested that there should be a term limit for special-seat MPs.⁵⁰ For other special-seat MPs, the aspiration to hold a higher parliamentary career has been the motivating force. According to Batilda Burian, a second-term CCM special-seat MP and Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, many special seats MPs prefer to hold constituency seats, which are regarded as a higher parliamentary career opportunity than special seats.⁵¹ A few factors have shaped this sense of hierarchy, which has become the source of their aspiration to hold constituency seats. First, although all MPs are presumably equal, constituency MPs, directly elected by the voters, are more respected by the public and within the parliament than special-seat MPs, who are viewed as favored and as representatives of only “fellow” women. Special-seat MPs dislike this view.⁵² Tatu Ntimizi, for example, states, “Male MPs’ perception that special-seats MPs are not capable of winning constituency seats and have nothing to do for the people motivated me to seek a constituency seat.”⁵³

Second, special-seat MPs lack autonomy in conducting their business outside of parliament. Whenever a special-seat MP visits a constituency in her region, she must inform the constituency MP of her visit and her planned activities in the constituency.⁵⁴ It is a norm for the special-seat MP to avoid discussing issues or projects that the constituency MP deals with, to avoid causing contention. Nevertheless, some constituency MPs perceive well-performing special-seat MPs as a threat because they worry that those MPs might seek and win their constituency seats in future elections.⁵⁵ Last, special-seat MPs have occasionally been disadvantaged in receiving government resources. For example, in the past, constituency MPs received larger allowances than special-seat MPs, though they were paid the same salaries. The government eventually equalized the allowances, but special-seat MPs had to fight to receive the same amount.⁵⁶ The most recent resource-related debate involving special-seat MPs has addressed the constituency-development fund, which the government plans to dispense soon. Special-seat MPs are concerned that they may not be eligible for the fund because they represent no constituency, even though, in a sense, they represent multiple constituencies.⁵⁷
If, as Joseph Schlesinger stated, “order is present in American political careers” (1966:117), politicians in the United States tend to move along a career path advancing from one level to the next, and the base office experience provides career mobility to the higher office in the office hierarchy (1966:73). This is just as in the Roman Republic & Empire (a well-documented tradition, called the cursus honorum, the “course of honors”). Is this also the case in the Tanzanian parliament? Has the special-seat experience helped special-seat MPs win constituency seats? Female MPs, in general, view special seats positively. According to them, special seats provide parliamentary experience, name recognition, competence, confidence, and courage, and can serve as stepping-stones to constituency seats. Special seats for women, Getrude Mongella states, have only advantages: “Given the historic disadvantages of women, if women had waited to go straight into the mainstream, they would have not made it to the parliament,” she says. This view is echoed by other female MPs, who believe that without special seats, there would be fewer women in the parliament. Mongella adds that special seats offer women a chance to show their talents and build up the voters’ confidence, so that it would be all right for them to be elected for the constituencies. According to other female MPs, the special-seat system, which grants special-seat MPs a mandate to reach out to people, allows them to build relations with the voters, even though they lack autonomy. In some constituencies, particularly where incumbents have lacked physical presence or failed to deliver services, special-seat MPs are more popular and better recognized than constituency MPs. The media, which report parliamentary debates and noticeable activities of special-seat MPs on a daily basis, help them build images as leaders. During my observation of the parliamentary budget debates, some female MPs, including special-seat MPs, were active debaters. Their speeches were broadcast live on national television and radio, and received coverage in newspapers.

Some special-seat MPs have deliberately and effectively used their tenure of special seats as a springboard to constituency seats. To build a profile in their target constituencies, they organized workshops, built schools, attended community events and ceremonies, supported women and youth events, lobbied for specific projects, and advocated interests of specific groups. They worked closely with local councilors and local party leaders, who have influence in the primaries. They have studied the weaknesses of constituency MPs when devising future campaign strategies. For example, Jenista Mhagama, who held a special seat in the last legislature, frequently visited people in her region and initiated tangible projects—improvement of schools, poverty eradication, and irrigation—for the region. She targeted the Peramiho constituency, where her parents were born, to contest in 2005. While she was living in the constituency, the constituency MP was living in Dar es Salaam. Therefore, when the constituency MP was not around, the constituents came to her for help. Voters value candidates who live in their midst, and her availability to the constituents, not to mention her hard
work as a special-seat MP, contributed to her victory. Zainab Gama, elected in the Kibaha Mjiini constituency in 2005 after holding a special seat from 1985 to 2005, attributes her winning to her availability to the constituents and her strong performance in projects as a special-seat MP. “Although the competition in the primary was fierce, I came out first,” she says.63

Many constituency MPs who have previously held a special seat took more than one term before moving to a constituency seat (table 5). According to Jenista Mhagama, one term is not quite enough to establish the foundation for winning a constituency seat, though she and others have won a constituency seat after their first term as special-seat MPs. Thus, it is difficult to generalize how many terms it usually takes for special-seat MPs to switch to constituency seats. Also, a few presidential appointees to parliament have switched to constituency seats (table 5). This raises the question of whether their parliamentary experience enabled them to move on to constituency seats. According to Anne Kilango Malecela, one of the two women appointed by former President Mkapa to the last legislature, and who was elected in the constituency in 2005, her experience as a presidential appointee contributed little to her winning a constituency seat in 2005. Unlike special-seat MPs, she had no region to work for: she was truly a national MP. “I was not answerable to anyone; no one asked me to do anything,” she says. The experience that helped her win, she states, was her defeat in the 2000 primary to her [male] opponent, Charles Keenja, by a narrow margin. After this defeat, President Mkapa asked her to campaign for CCM candidates in Pemba; he then recognized her contribution to the party by appointing her to a parliamentary seat. Based on her experience in the 2000 primary, she ran more-effective campaigns in 2005, which eventually led her to victory.64 Anna Abdallah, a presidential appointee in the 1990–1995 legislature, had long political experience as a regional commissioner and later as a minister which might have helped her win a constituency seat in 1995 for the first time.

As stated earlier, MPs, including special-seat MPs, often hold cabinet positions in Tanzania. Of twenty-nine ministers and thirty-one deputy ministers in President Jakaya Kikwete’s cabinet in 2007, five ministers and ten deputy ministers were women. Among them, three ministers and seven deputy ministers were special-seat MPs.65 Richard Faustine, Esterina Kilasi, and Hawa Ghasia state that holding cabinet positions can help special-seat MPs win constituency seats by increasing their visibility and providing them with easier access to resources for their projects.66 However, Anne Makinda says that holding a cabinet position does not guarantee winning a constituency seat: she states that she almost lost her first contest in the constituency in 1995 to a male opponent because of the electorate’s cultural bias against women, even though she had occupied ministerial positions for many years and was an incumbent minister in 1995. Even Getrude Mongella, a minister from 1982 to 1990, defeated her opponent with only a 1 percent margin when she first contested in the constituency in 2000, says Makinda.67 Of five special-seat MPs who won constituency seats in 2005, only two have held
cabinet positions: Mary Nagu as a minister and Zabein Mhita as a deputy minister. Therefore, the positive impact of holding a cabinet position on winning a constituency seat seems to be inconclusive.

To sum up, special seats have helped special-seat MPs win constituency seats. The linear increase in the number of women elected in the constituencies, particularly since the adoption of the multiparty system, is due largely to the movements of special-seat MPs to constituency seats. The Tanzania Women Parliamentary Group (TWPG), a nonpartisan parliamentary women’s caucus, has been instrumental in encouraging special-seat MPs to run for constituency seats and in providing them with advice and training, including mental training for the challenges that female candidates usually encounter during their campaigns in the constituencies.68

Tanzania has made steady progress in improving women’s representation in its legislature. Women’s parliamentary representation is likely to improve even further in 2010, although the mechanism for achieving this is yet to be decided. In line with the African Union’s call for 50 percent representation of women at all levels of political decision-making positions, the CCM put forth a goal of 50/50 representation by men and women in politics through its election manifesto in 2005. The current CCM government is obliged to put its words into an action in the next election, in 2010. Various methods, including a further increase in the percentage of parliamentary seats for women from 30 percent, have been discussed among MPs. All the female MPs I interviewed supported a model that would elect one woman and one man in each constituency. Would this model, if materialized, mean the end of the special-seat system for women? Because of it, Getrude Mongella states, “more women have entered the parliament and have gained political experience, and the period only depending on special seats to improve women’s parliamentary representation now must come to an end.” She adds: “The country has to devise a mechanism that enables 50/50 representation through elections.” Therefore, I conclude, with mechanics of achieving the goal of 50/50 representation by men and women on the table, both the Tanzanian parliament and the special-seat system are undoubtedly at a pivotal juncture.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author thanks the Faculty Development Committee of Hanover College for its grants for this project.
Table 1:
Number of Women in Parliament, 1985–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number of Parliamentary Seats</th>
<th>Elected in Constituencies</th>
<th>Elected through Special Seats for Women (Mass Organizations)</th>
<th>Appointed by the President (Regional Commissioners)</th>
<th>From the Zanzibar House of Representatives</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under Single-Party Rule</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under Multiparty Rule</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>30.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These are postelection numbers of the indicated election years. "% of women" refers to the percentage of parliamentary seats held by women in each election year.

Table 2:
Multiparty Election Results by Party, 1995–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Constituency Seats</th>
<th>Number of Special Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>232</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>231</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>232</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CCM: Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CUF: Civic United Front
NCCR-Mageuzi: National Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi
CHADEMA: Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
UDP: United Democratic Party
TLP: Tanzania Labour Party

Table 3:
Number of Candidates for Constituency Seats by Gender, 1990–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number of Constituencies</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of constituencies in 2000 was 231 because of the abolition of the Mitema constituency, but it became 232 again in 2005 with a split of the Kibaha constituency into two.

Table 4:
Number of Candidates and Constituency Seats by Political Party, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Number of Women (Men) Nominated</th>
<th>Total Candidates</th>
<th>Number of Women (Men) Elected</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
<td>19 (213)</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>16 (190)</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil United Front</td>
<td>13 (200)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1 (18)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>11 (133)</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0 (5)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party</td>
<td>11 (104)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>8 (63)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party</td>
<td>10 (28)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAUSTA</td>
<td>12 (49)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahazi Asilia</td>
<td>9 (46)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT-Maenadeleo</td>
<td>0 (16)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>11 (34)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>2 (32)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauti ya Umma</td>
<td>10 (42)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National League for Democracy</td>
<td>15 (14)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United People's Democratic Party</td>
<td>13 (29)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reconstruction Alliance</td>
<td>6 (21)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasia Makini</td>
<td>0 (16)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORD</td>
<td>3 (8)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Multiparty Democracy</td>
<td>6 (15)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>159 (1063)</td>
<td>1222</td>
<td>17 (215)</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CHADEMA: Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
NCCR-Mageuzi: National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi
CHAUSTA: Chama cha Haki na Usitawi
PPT-Maenadeleo: Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maenadeleo
FORD: Forum for Restoration of Democracy
### Table 5:
**Female Constituency MPs, 1985–2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
                 | Maua Yusuf Hamad  
                 | Leila Nassor Khamis  
                 | Shamim Parkar Khan |
                         | Kate Sylvia Magdalena Kamba  
                         | Shamim Parkar Khan  
                         | Gisler Mapunda  
                         | Raya Khamis Mwinyi |
                         | Anne Semamba Makinda (special seat, 1975–1995)  
                         | Tatu Musa Ntimizi (special seat, 1990–1995)  
                         | Teddy Kilenza Magayane  
                         | Fatma Mussa Maghimbi |
                         | Monica N. Mbega (special seat, 1995–2000)  
                         | Getrude Ibengwe Mongella (special seat, 1980–1995)  
                         | Estherina Julio Kilasi  
                         | Hadija Kasola Kusaga  
                         | Ruth Blasio Msafiri  
                         | Zuhura Shamis Abdallah  
                         | Faida Mohamed Bakar  
                         | Rita Louise Mlaki  |
Table 5:
Female Constituency MPs, 1985–2010, continued

2005–2010 (17)

Zainab Gama [special seat, 1985–2005]**
Teddy Louise Kasella-Bantu [special seat, 1995–2005]**
Anne Kilango Malecela [appointed, 2000–2005]**
Jenista J. M. Mhagama [special seat, 2000–2005]**
Zabein Muhaji Mhita [special seat, 2000–2005]**
Mary Michael Nagu [special seat, 1995–2005]**
Hawa Abdulrahman Ghasia
Esterina Julio Kilasi
Celina Ompeshi Kombani
Fatma Mussa Maghimbi
Rita Louise Mlaki
Ruth Blasiko Msafriri
Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo

***Appointed or special-seat MPs in the previous legislatures. Their names are also boldfaced.

Sources: Volumes of National Assembly's Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Parliament of Tanzania.
1. Other African countries that have met this goal are Rwanda (48.8%), Mozambique (34.8%), South Africa (32.8%), and Burundi (30.5%). See Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007).
2. The first election under the one-party system was held in 1965.
3. Tanzania delayed holding elections to allow the parliament elected in 1990 to complete its full five-year term, up to October 1995 (Msekwa 2005).
5. Interviews with CCM special-seat MPs, Dodoma, June 2007.
8. Interview with Richard Faustine, Dar es Salaam, 14 June 2007. Faustine is the Field Office Director of the Parliamentary Strengthening Program in Tanzania of the Center for International Development / The State University of New York.
9. Tanzania used the East African shilling until 1966, when the Tanzanian shilling replaced it.
10. Interview with Usu Mallya, Executive Director of the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2007.
12. I drew their names from Tanganyika National Assembly (1961), Assembly Debates (Hansard).
13. Interviews with female MPs, Dodoma, June 2007, and Usu Mallya.
14. Interview with Anne Makinda.
15. For more on how special seats were divided in 1995 among the eligible parties, see National Electoral Commission (1997:70).
17. Interviews with CCM female MPs, Dodoma, June 2007.
19. Interview with Fatma Maghimbí, a CUF constituency MP, Dodoma, 21 June 2007. She was the first opposition leader in the National Assembly.
20. Interviews with female MPs.
21. Interview with Fatma Maghimbí.
22. Interview with Hawa Ghasia, a first-term CCM constituency MP and Minister of State for Public Service Management in the President’s Office, Dodoma, 21 June 2007.
27. Interviews with female MPs.
28. An opposition special-seat MP states that a campaign for a constituency seat usually costs 200 to 300 million Tanzanian shillings (about US$182,000 to US$273,000).
29. The Returning Officer deals with nominations of parliamentary candidates for the constituency and coordinates campaign schedules of the candidates in the constituency.
30. Interviews with female MPs.
31. Statutory laws, however, allow women to own or inherit land or property.
32. Interviews with female constituency MPs, Dodoma, June 2007.
33. Interviews with Mwanawetu Zarafi and Fatma Maghimbi.
34. Interviews with female MPs.
35. For MPs’ profiles, see Parliament of Tanzania.
37. Interviews with Ichikaeli Maro, Chairperson of the Tanzania Media Women’s Association, Dar es Salaam, 13 June 2007 and Usu Mallya.
38. For the list of political parties and their registration dates, see National Electoral Commission (2005). The total number of female candidates that the newly registered parties fielded for the 2005 election is compiled from table 4.
39. Interview with Maua Daftari.
41. Interview with Esterina Kilasi.
42. Interview with Anne Makinda.
43. Gama received 59.1 percent of her constituency votes; Kasella-Bantu, 74.3 percent; Mhita, 60.8 percent; Mahagama, 93.2 percent; and Nagu, 90.1 percent. See National Electoral Commission (2006b).
44. Interviews with Hawa Ghasia and Ichikaeli Maro.
45. Interview with Maua Daftari.
46. Interviews with Ichikaeli Maro and Anne Makinda.
47. Interview with Anne Makinda.
48. Interview with Anne Makinda.
49. Interview with Zainab Gama, Dodoma, 21 June 2007.
51. Interview with Batilda Burian.
52. Interviews with special seats MPs.
55. Interviews with special-seat MPs.
56. interview with Maua Daftari.
57. Interview with Anne Makinda.
59. Interviews with female MPs.
60. Interviews with Richard Faustine and female MPs.
61. Interview with Anne Makinda.
62. Interview with Jenista Mhagama.
63. Interview with Zainab Gama.
64. Interview with Anne Kilango Malecela, Dodoma, 19 June 2007.
65. For the list of ministers and deputy ministers, see United Republic of Tanzania (2006).
67. Interview with Anne Makinda.
68. Interview with Anne Makinda, who is also the president of TWPG. Created in 1997 to improve the coordination among female MPs across the parties on women’s issues, TWPG draws its members from sitting female MPs.
REFERENCES CITED


